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Abstract 
 
Although standardization is the norm in franchising, autonomy is desired by franchisees, which 
may lead to potential control issues. This qualitative research follows a problem-solving format 
and is focused on the control challenge faced by Artisani’s franchising, a Portuguese artisanal 
ice cream company, characterized by low standardization. The aim was developing the overall 
control system for the chain. Primary data was collected through interviews with the 
management team and one franchisee, and then crossed with secondary sources. The results 
implicate that control should be adapted to franchisees’ level of experience and characteristics 
to ensure compliance, while maintaining their autonomy. 
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Introduction 
Control mechanisms are indispensable in franchising (Cavusgil et al., 2014; Das and Teng, 
2001). As it consists on a hierarchical and interdependent relationship between legally 
independent parties (Beshel, 2010), power unbalances and goal conflicts can arise, leading to 
non-compliance and damaging the network’s performance (Boulay, 2010). Control minimizes 
that risk and protects the value of the brand (Cavusgil et al., 2014; Dant and Gundlach, 1999), 
even though it can be difficulted by franchisees’ desire for autonomy. 
The dichotomy of control and autonomy was analyzed by Davies et al. (2011), who built on 
Pizanti and Lerner’s (2003) conclusions, while the relationship between trust and control was 
widely studied by Das and Teng (2001) - without a focus on franchising - and by Yakimova et 
al. (2018) whose research explained how social control motivates franchisees’ brand-
supportive behavior. So, although control in franchising has been researched, conclusions were 
fragmented, lacking a focus on the overall management control system within a single 
franchising chain (Verbieren et al., 2008). This project aims to contribute to fill that gap, 
through a problem-centered, case study approach, by developing a control system for Artisani’s 
franchising (By Artisani), created in 2014 and now representing between 20-25% of revenue. 
Artisani is the commercial brand of Sabores do Dia- Gelados Artesanais Lda., a Portuguese 
artisanal ice cream company. Control is a current challenge, because the same mechanisms are 
used for all franchisees, when each one has its own identity, due to the unusual high level of 
autonomy provided. Therefore, the objective is suggesting a framework of adaptable control, 
to satisfy the franchisor’s need for compliance without compromising franchisees’ autonomy.  
The study has six sections. First, the literature review, grouped by themes regarding control in 
franchising, to provide a theoretical background. It is followed by research methods, including 
the context of the study, as well as the data collection and analysis methodology. Next, there is 
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the diagnosis of the issue, and then the analysis of current control mechanisms. The consequent 
section regards the proposed solution, and the final one includes discussion and conclusions. 
Literature review 
1.The standardization-adaptation paradox. As the owner of a brand replicated by 
independent entrepreneurs, the franchisor must ensure a certain level of quality and consistency. 
That is one of the main drivers for standardization (Kauffmann and Eroglu, 1999; Hornsby, 
2011). However, in spite of being the norm, standardization may not be the most suitable option 
(Liu et al., 2014; Gillis et al., 2018). Franchisees’ motivation can be an inhibitor (Kauffmann 
and Eroglu, 1999), due to concerns related with product/service fit, free riding (Gillis, 2018), 
and their desire for autonomy (Dant and Gundlach, 1999). Zeng et al. (2012) researched the 
authenticity–standardization paradox in the food service sector and concluded that even though 
food is the core element for perceived consistency, elements related with the store’s 
atmosphere, e.g. music and decoration, can create the feeling of a common experience, 
ensuring, simultaneously, consistency and local markets’ authenticity. So, if consistency is 
guaranteed for the franchisor, a less standardized system can be positive for franchisees, due to 
their entrepreneurial preferences (Davies et al., 2011), although it difficults control. 
2.Control’s relevance in franchising: The business system transferred from the franchisor to 
the franchisee is composed mainly by know-how, procedures and methodologies (Fernandes, 
2016), and according to the knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV), globalization turned 
knowledge into “the most strategic resource” and learning into “the most fundamental activity 
for competitiveness” (OECD, 1996), so these resources and capabilities must be protected. 
Control has that goal, as it refers to a set of procedures and instruments used to monitor 
behaviors and activities of franchisees, and to establish standards, so that the franchisor can 
evaluate, direct and compensate them (Anderson and Oliver, 1987), making them more 
predictable and facilitating the pursuit of common objectives (Leifer and Mills, 1996). 
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Research defined two types of formal control – behavior and outcome (Anderson and Oliver, 
1987; Heide et al., 2007) - and one type of informal one - social control (Das and Teng, 2001; 
Yakimova et al., 2018). Behavior control regards the definition of how procedures should be 
conducted, e.g. defining and monitoring the approach to customers or doing checkups of 
operating methods (Heide et al., 2007), so it includes the franchisor’s support function (Quinn 
and Doherty, 2000). Outcome control aims to achieve a certain performance level, and consists 
on defining, monitoring and evaluating outcomes, e.g. sales revenue, product quality or 
customer satisfaction (Das and Teng, 2011; Crosno and Tong, 2018). Among the two, outcome 
control allows for higher autonomy, so as franchisees become more experienced, this type of 
control positively influences their satisfaction, while behavior control does not have a positive 
neither a negative effect (Mellewigt et al., 2011). Distinctively, social control comprises setting 
a common culture and values to increase franchisees’ commitment and the probability of an 
alignment of goals (Yakimova et al., 2018). Therefore, both types of control are complementary 
to concurrently maintain compliance and trust in the relationship (Yakimova et al., 2018). 
3. Trust’s impact on control: Franchising comprises an interdependence between both parties, 
with an underlying asymmetry of power, which increases the likelihood of conflicts (Davies et 
al., 2011). Trust acts on it as a cohesive element (Davies et al., 2011), being defined as “the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to another, despite the ability to monitor or control it” 
(Mayer et al, 1995). It can be based on reputation and built through communication, or related 
with the partner’s ability to perform well, which depends on defining mutual interests, to inhibit 
conflicts and increase the sense of reliability (Das and Teng, 2001). Trust decreases the 
perceived total risk- composed by performance and relational risk, respectively related with not 
reaching objectives and not having cooperation (Das and Teng, 2001)- acting mostly on its 
relational component through the enforcement of positive relationships (Dickey et al., 2008). 
Control also aims to reduce risk, sharing that goal with trust: output control is more effective 
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with performance risk and behavior control with relational risk (Das and Teng, 2001). However, 
the relationship between both concepts depends on the type of control. Formal control has a 
negative and substitutive relationship with trust (Sengun and Wasti, 2009; Long, 2018), while 
social control, which defines common goals and rules and increases mutual understanding, 
positively impacts trust instead (Kalkman and de Waard, 2017). Furthermore, the intent of 
formal control is also significant in terms of perceived trust, as it may be designed to strictly 
avoid deviation from franchisor’s terms (coercive control) or to create a system of regular 
feedback, flexibility and support (enabling control), which is better perceived by franchisees 
(Yakimova et al., 2018). Thus, control and trust are linked concepts that must be integrated, 
and if the franchisor focusses on motivating cooperation through control, franchisees can 
perceive it as a demonstration of trustworthiness (Long, 2018) and it achieves better results. 
4. The relationship between control and autonomy: Autonomy, often desired by franchisees, 
is “the capacity or will for independence regarding actions and thoughts” (Dant and Gundlach, 
1999). Franchisors should balance between standardization and efficient local adaptation 
(Kauffman and Eroglu, 1999), since not attending that desire for autonomy can lead to 
diminished compliance (Davies et al. 2011), but excessive autonomy may be averse to authority 
and control (Dant and Gundlach, 1999). Pizanti and Lerner (2003) gathered two approaches 
regarding the balance between both concepts and suggested a third one. (1) High levels of 
control and standardization - the franchisor applies strong control and demands compliance 
with the agreement and submission to a hierarchical system; (2) Entrepreneurial franchising- 
by giving franchisees some participation in the definition of business processes, the franchisor 
can simultaneously increase their compromise, satisfy their need for autonomy, and satisfy its 
own need for compliance (Bills, 1998; Dant and Gundlach, 1999; Davies et al., 2011).  
(3) Conceptual model to balance between control and autonomy (with the limitation of being 
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focused on Israel’s market), concluding these are not paradoxical concepts and that control 
must consider the chain’s characteristics to be effective. 
5. Control mechanisms: A table with contributions by author can be found on appendix A. 
5.1. Behavior control. It can include policies and procedures, as a part of the contract, 
determining behavior standards and associated rewards or penalties, as well as training for 
regulation and standardization of methodologies (Das and Teng, 2001). Yakimova et al. (2018), 
through the combination of enabling and coercive dimensions, stated that franchisors should 
create methodologies to monitor compliance, but also to implement remedial actions when 
necessary. That is part of its support function, which additionally includes the development 
plan, norms manual, support for store opening, ongoing visits and training of franchisees’ staff 
(Doherty and Alexander, 2006). All these allow for an alignment of methods. 
5.2. Output control. Among the mechanisms suggested are setting objectives; planning and 
budgeting to conduct an evaluation of results; performance monitoring and implementation of 
adjustments. These should be done while ensuring that the necessary resources and support are 
assigned to each objective (Das and Teng, 2001). Brookes and Roper (2011) specified that 
targets should be mainly financial and as reinforced by Yakimova et al. (2018), the target 
definition should be shared by both parties, to promote an alignment of interests and reduce 
performance gaps. Research also highlighted institutionalized control mechanisms like lawsuit 
clauses in the contract, for a clear understanding of outputs (e.g. sales projections) and 
associated rewards or consequences (Das and Teng, 2001; Brookes and Roper, 2011). However, 
coercive control mainly exercised through the franchising agreement is not the most effaceable, 
working primarily as a safeguard and not used on a daily basis (Doherty and Alexander, 2006). 
5.3. Social control. The goal is creating a shared vision, culture and values. That could be 
achieved through shared participation in decision-making processes and implementation of 
activities such as ceremonies, frequent socialization moments, and increased communication 
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regarding procedures and the value of innovations, highly relevant when parties are independent 
to increase their motivation to implement them (Das and Teng, 2001; Yakimova et al., 2018). 
That communication must be multi-directional, not only franchisor-franchisee (Brookes and 
Roper, 2011). Additionally, Yakimova et al. (2018) proposed “social-comparison-activating-
procedures” consisting on brand performance monitoring, through cross-unit business 
standards, to encourage comparisons with best performers and the share of best practices.  
6. Control effects: In theory, control stimulates the drive to act in the franchisor’s best interest 
and increases the engagement with duties and responsibilities, however mechanisms may not 
always lead to the desired outcomes (Crosno and Tong, 2018). Both disciplining and crowding 
out effects can arise. Disciplining effects are positive and happen when control succeeds in 
ensuring franchisees’ effort to benefit the franchisor, through better preparation and access to 
more information (Crosno and Brown, 2015). Besides, they realize that opportunistic actions 
are easier to discover (Antia et al., 2006). Crowding out effects, however, are negative, 
unintended and can happen when mechanisms decrease franchisees’ incentive to act on 
franchisor’s best interests. Four possible causes were identified: high costs associated with 
control; the impact on autonomy; perception as lack of trust; and control seen as unfair (Crosno 
and Brown, 2015). Such effects and control’s efficacy can be related with franchisees’ 
experience. In initial stages, behavior control tends to perform better, as inexperienced 
franchisees usually are more receptive to procedures to increase their competence, and they 
require more guidance and effort from the franchisor. Outcome control attains better results 
later, since defining performance objectives may put too much pressure on recent franchisees 
that are still adapting to business methods (Crosno and Tong, 2018; Mellewigt et al., 2011).  
Thus, instead of two dichotomous concepts, formal control and autonomy are complementary. 
These should be adapted to perceived risk and to franchisees’ level of experience, and combined 
with trust-building procedures, through social control, as discussed before. 
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Research Methods 
1. Context of the study. According to the World Franchising Council and the Portuguese 
Franchising Association (APF), from 2015 to 2017, Portugal ranked in the 27th position overall, 
and 8th in Europe regarding the number of franchised brands, showing the current relevance of 
this strategy.  In 2016, the market was dominated by national brands and most networks had 
until 4 units (Mateus, 2017). By sectors, services were dominant (66%), with restaurants and 
hospitality in third (11%) - 4% in the business of ice creams, juices or yogurts (APF, 2016). 
The main reasons to create franchises were the existent awareness and credibility of the brand, 
financial rentability and the know-how previously tested in the market (APF, 2016).  
In 2017, the national ice cream sector registered a revenue growth of 2% and an average 
consumption per capita of 6.6 kg (Statista, 2018). Concerning the volume consumed (kg) by 
category (appendix B), Take-home and Bulk Ice cream was dominant (53.9%), followed by 
Impulse Ice Cream (33.6%) and then Artisanal Ice Cream (12,5%) (Canadean, 2015). The 
results for this last category may be explained by its average price/kg - the highest (12,9€) - and 
by less distribution channels, creating the need to find alternative strategies to increase results. 
The franchising network selected as an object of study, Artisani, operates in that category and 
currently includes 12 franchised units. Regarding competition, despite the unavailability of 
market shares, Santini, Geladaria D’Avvero and Nannarella were highlighted by the manager. 
Among these, none has adopted franchising as a strategy. But others like Gelados de Portugal 
or Amorino also use franchising, although none has a model with such low standardization like 
Artisani. That is its distinctive trait and allows for less resources applied to expand to a new 
location (check appendix C to see the opening costs of one of Artisani’s owned-stores, which 
in franchising are supported by the franchisee). However, this option includes less control over 
product and service quality than owned-stores, and “artisanal ice cream is a very sensitive 
product with a strict production process and a high concern for quality” (Luísa Lacerda, 2018). 
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2. Data collection and analysis. This study follows a problem-centered approach, as the 
research problem was defined with the company. It has a case study format, because it is 
focused on exploring the matter of control within a single franchising network, in the everyday 
context in which occurs (Yin, 2009). The objective is understanding current gaps and then, 
based on a combination of the literature analyzed with the company’s information, suggest a 
customized solution. The unusual lack of standardization in the chain and the high autonomy 
of franchisees regarding brand and performance management, makes it an intrinsic case study 
(Stake, 1995). The literature review section was built with the most relevant information 
collected from articles regarding control in franchising or in strategic alliances from online 
databases (e.g. Emerald Insight, Sage Journals, Science Direct, Google Scholar), and then 
categorized into themes according to keywords. After, it was necessary to gather inputs about 
Artisani’s franchising system. Primary data was gathered utilizing a qualitative approach, 
through two separate semi-structured interviews (consult appendix D), which lasted between 
30-45 minutes, with the general manager, Luísa Lacerda, and with the marketing manager, João 
Gaspar. The first one had the goal of diagnosing control issues. It included questions regarding 
the company’s situation and the franchising system. Control was jointly defined as the research 
problem, so current control mechanisms were the focus. By crossing these data with the 
literature review, it was possible to develop the framework of control and associated 
mechanisms. After that, there was another interview, focused on the discussion of the proposed 
system to collect additional contributions and analyze its applicability. The perspective of 
franchisees was also necessary to mitigate potential resistance and crowding out effects. So, 
one of the franchisees, pointed by the manager due to high participation in decision-making 
processes, was interviewed to provide its opinion of the proposed solution. Even though 
qualitative data can be considered as less rigorous, that can be amended by limiting the scope, 
design and goals of the research (Buber et al., 2004), which was done. The extension of data 
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from the interviews allowed for a manual analysis and categorization, which was then 
complemented with information from Artisani’s franchising agreement, mystery client reports 
and the brand book (documents that involve both parties), to check for bias. These documents 
are confidential, nonetheless can be consulted upon request. 
Diagnosis of the issue 
By Artisani stores do not present the typical level of standardization of franchising (see 
appendix E). Franchisees are granted with a relatively high level of autonomy, mostly 
regarding brand and goal setting. Lower standardization allows for lower effort and costs for 
Artisani and satisfies entrepreneurial motivations of franchisees. Still, excessive autonomy may 
negatively impact control (Dant and Gundlach, 1999). The motivation to create By Artisani 
stores was fighting seasonality, so initially, franchisees had another core business and Artisani’s 
product was a complement, benefiting from their sales. Due to that, it was not even referred by 
the company as franchising. Currently it is, and the network already includes franchisees with 
ice cream as core business as well, which are responsible for a higher amount of sales. Yet, 
control remained the same for all franchisees, without any adaptation to their specificities. 
1. Franchisor and franchisee’s responsibilities  
The franchisor owns all rights over production and distribution know-how associated with the 
brands Artisani and By Artisani. The ones regarding distribution know-how and the use of the 
second brand are transferred to the franchisee during the period of the agreement. The 
franchisor is additionally responsible for the store’s architectural project and layout, charging 
the final cost to the franchisee after it is concluded, in an effort to ensure image consistency for 
customers (SISAB Portugal, 2018). Included in Artisani’s responsibilities are also the menu 
definition and design, 100 hours of training to all employees which will handle the ice cream, 
and staff from owned-stores to assist at inaugurations. The franchisee, on the other hand, is 
responsible for the exploration of the business unit, complying with Artisani’s operating 
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methods. It must pay an initial fee with a value between 3.000-10.000€ but no royalties and can 
have its own brand, with the requirement of adding “By Artisani”. Moreover, franchisees have 
freedom to define selling prices for the products, allowing each one to define its margin of 
profit, although Artisani shares the reference price to which they are sold in owned-stores. 
Franchisees must exclusively acquire the products from Artisani or indicated suppliers. A 25% 
discount over ice cream’s price per kg is granted if ordered in solid state, and 30% in liquid 
state, as this last one ensures better quality, so it should be encouraged.  
Table 1. Franchisor and franchisee’s rights and obligations derived from the franchising 
agreement 
 Franchisor Franchisee 
Rights - Create or adapt franchisee’s logotype 
- Define certain elements of store’s image (i.e. flavor 
tags, menu, uniforms, wall pictures) 
- Define store’s layout and conduct the project with an 
architect of its choice 
- Use the brand “By Artisani”  
- Receive Artisani’s distribution know-how and 
methodologies  
- Have its own brand and manage operations with 
independence  
- Define selling prices in the store 
Obligations - Provide the products   
- Provide 100 hours of training to franchisee’s staff 
- Share contacts of complementary products’ suppliers 
- Share its methodologies and procedures 
- Provide technical support necessary to store’s 
implementation 
- Grant a commercial discount of 25% or 30% over the 
prices per kg of each flavor 
- Pay the initial fee (€3K-€10K) and the 
architectural project to Artisani 
- Acquire any product exclusively to the 
 franchisor or any other suggested supplier 
- Achieve ≥ 85% score at monthly Mystery  
Client performance evaluations 
- Communicate any promotions to Artisani for an 
approval of conditions and promotional materials 
 
2. Perceived risk: Currently, some standardization is imposed through the use of same 
suppliers, and through certain elements of stores’ atmosphere, coincident with the ones 
identified by Zeng et al. (2012) to build a common experience for customers. However, each 
franchise has its own identity and control is necessary to avoid the brand’s fragmentation. 
The lack of control over product and service quality at franchised units, especially with a 
product as sensitive as artisanal ice cream, is a major concern, as customers may have the same 
expectations for franchised units as for owned-stores, and in the case of significant gaps, 
Artisani’s brand’s value may be damaged. According to Luísa Lacerda, “complaints about 
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service at franchised units have been made directly to Artisani before”, proving that product 
and service quality are perceived as a franchisor’s responsibility. Additionally, the impact of 
non-compliance by franchisees depends if ice cream is or not the core business. Non-
compliance of franchises with ice cream as the core business comprises more risk for Artisani 
for two reasons: (1) These represented 73% of total sales from Artisani to franchised stores 
(consult appendix F) in August of 2018 (the strongest month in terms of sales, and thus 
representative of full capacity), meaning that these comprise higher relevance for the franchisor 
in terms of results and in case of non-compliance, those results can be compromised, 
encompassing further risk for Artisani; (2) It is more likely that customers have higher 
expectations regarding the level of product and service quality at these units, because the 
purpose of their visit is solely consuming ice cream and Artisani’s brand may be one of the 
decision drivers, contrary to units with other core business, like a restaurant. 
Artisani recognizes that until the inauguration much support is provided, but then franchisees 
gain more independence and the company does not gather information regarding their business 
performance, neither defines goals for each one. Artisani knows the amount of ice cream it 
provides to each franchisee, but not if it is actually sold to the final customer. Thus, the company 
faces high performance risk (Das and Teng, 1996). Moreover, franchisees may show an absence 
of brand commitment, due to the positioning of By Artisani as a sub-brand, and the lack of 
royalty fees may negatively impact their motivation to contribute to Artisani’s goals and 
strategic plans, representing relational risk (Das and Teng, 1996).  
Hence, Artisani needs to implement further control mechanisms to track franchisees’ 
performance and define the level of support it should give to each one, accordingly. 
Analysis 
1. Currently used control mechanisms: The high level of autonomy of franchisees implies 
the need for control. The brand By Artisani has reduced relevance in franchisees’ logotypes, 
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exactly because the company recognizes the risk associated with the current franchising system 
and wants to protect the brand. The franchisor does not make distinctions on the level of control 
according to the franchisee. There are five control mechanisms used: the franchising agreement, 
mystery client reports, the brand book, training to staff and occasional visits by the management 
team, not periodically scheduled.  
1.1. The franchising agreement: is the legal document that regulates the relationship, as the 
parties involved are independent (Beshel, 2010). It is a mechanism of formal control, both 
behavior and output, considered a compliance-promoting procedure according to Yakimova et 
al. (2018), since its main goal is to ensure compliance, by stating which are the conditions 
franchisees have to follow, mainly respecting all of Artisani’s methodologies and procedures, 
in an effort to ensure quality for customers. That is controlled by demanding a minimum score 
of 85% in monthly mystery client reports. However, a gap that may be reflected in the efficiency 
of the contract is the lack of associated punishments or rewards for compliance, for each 
obligation. Only one clause of the contract mentions that the termination can happen in case the 
parties do not comply, and in case that termination is verified the franchisee has to remove the 
brand from the store. However, the fact is that research showed the agreement functions mostly 
as a safeguard, not as a daily source of control (Dohorty and Alexander, 2006). 
1.2. The monthly mystery client (MC) report: based on a defined set of criteria that should 
be evaluated and communicated to Artisani, with a score of 0-100%. According to Luísa 
Lacerda, if the score is under 85%, improvement measures are suggested, although there is not 
a formal plan defined. The MC orders the same product every time: a cone/cup with one scoop 
of a flavor of choice. Through that order, it must evaluate the existence of suggestive sales and 
if the tasting of additional flavors is offered, registering the employee’s name, as well as the 
traffic in store. The final score is a combination of the presence or absence of several 
requirements regarding the store, product and service. In terms of the store, it evaluates the 
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cleanness and overall atmosphere (e.g. WC, ice cream showcasing, and existence and 
positioning of informational signs). Concerning the product, requirements are related with 
storing conditions, presentation, flavor, texture and quantity served, although the last three are 
to be evaluated subjectively, according to own expectations. Regarding service, the posture, 
presentation of employees and their interaction with customers are the criteria. Additionally, 
there is a section for qualitative comments. Thus, this instrument is classified as behavior 
control, since although it sets a performance objective through a minimum score, the elements 
involved are mostly related with how procedures should be conducted (Heide et al., 2007).   
1.3. The brand book: concerns a list of requirements for the use of the brand By Artisani and 
design norms for communication materials. Consequently, concerns behavior control, as it 
gathers a group of procedures to be followed in terms of brand communication.  
1.4. Training: totalizes a hundred hours and is grouped into six modules- 1. Artisani’s 
presentation; 2. Differences between Artisanal and Industrial ice cream; 3. Product’s 
knowledge; 4. Practical training; 5. Customer service; 6. Introduction to HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point)- Hygiene and Food Safety. This allows for the transference 
of methodologies and procedures to franchisees’ staff, so it is classified as behavior control. 
Nonetheless, training happens before inauguration and no more periodical sessions are planned, 
although franchisees can require it in case of new hires for example. 
1.5. Visits from Artisani’s managers: may happen to evaluate conditions and discuss any 
matters related with the relationship between both parties but are not systematically defined.  
Through this analysis, following Pizanti and Lerner’s (2003) study concerning control and 
autonomy, it is possible to conclude that currently, Artisani presents an “entrepreneurial 
franchising”. Franchisees are granted with high levels of autonomy to organize their operations, 
define their own brand, goals and how to achieve them, with reduced franchisor’s interventions. 
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Besides, there is a focus on behavior control instead of outcome control and a total absence of 
social control mechanisms. 
Proposed solution 
As previously stated, control is a challenge for By Artisani’s network. The franchisor has been 
focusing on behavior control for all franchisees, which is understandable since the network was 
created only four years ago, and the initial lack of has led to the rise of behavior control instead 
of output control. In the beginning, behavior control tends to perform better, as franchisees need 
more guidance and support and are more receptive to it. However, output control allows for 
higher autonomy and thus, has a more positive effect on franchisees’ satisfaction as they 
become more experienced (Mellewigt et al., 2011; Crosno and Tong, 2018). Moreover, due to 
the lack of performance monitoring, performance risk is a concern for Artisani, and according 
to Das and Teng (2001), output control is more effective to deal with it. Yet, it is essential to 
avoid the causes of crowding out effects and stimulate disciplining effects. That can be reached 
through the integration of social control mechanisms with formal ones (Yakimova et al., 2018) 
and by focusing on enabling instead of coercive procedures, giving more support, feedback and 
flexibility, alternatively to imposing constraints. That will positively impact trust, and motivate 
a brand-supportive behavior, while maintaining franchisees’ autonomy, avoiding the first 
causes of crowding out effects. Other causes are control seen as unfair, and the costs associated 
(Crosno and Brown, 2015), so it is important to ensure franchisees will not have financial 
obligations to sustain control.  
1. Proposed control mechanisms 
1.1. Behavior control: Artisani’s current mechanisms can be maintained, but with adjustments. 
For the MC report, corrective measures must be previously defined and associated to flaws on 
each dimension evaluated: the store, the product and the service. For service issues, further 
training at owned-stores should be provided, focused on remembering and practicing the 
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“customer service” module; for product issues it could be practical training sessions of the 
handling procedures in Artisani’s factory or owned-stores; and for store issues the measures 
can include the suggestion of an external cleaning service or the repairment/substitution of 
damaged equipment. In addition, periodic training sessions after the store’s inauguration are 
also suggested, according to needs, to ensure the maintenance of quality standards, include 
employees hired posteriorly and cover recent innovations. Visits from the management team 
should be maintained, but scheduled for each franchisee, according to their performance. Some 
should be scheduled with the franchisee and allow for preparation, and others not combined or 
unannounced, to monitor the state of operations in their everyday context.  
1.2. Output control: Currently, Artisani has no defined mechanisms of output control. Hence, 
it is proposed that both parties jointly outline performance objectives. This shared participation 
in decision-making processes allows for a sense of trust and for an alignment of goals, 
decreasing conflicts. Furthermore, it is not enough to set goals, it is necessary to monitor them 
and implement adjustments if needed. Thus, Artisani must create a periodical performance 
report for each franchisee, including the following elements, for which individual targets should 
be set according to stores’ location and if ice cream is the core business or not: 
Table 2. Proposed elements for each franchisee’s Performance Report  
A template report can be found in appendix G, with illustrative data.  
At the moment, Artisani defines sales objectives for owned-stores, based on previous sales, and 
is planning to monitor if the portions served follow the standards imposed, by crossing the 
number of units sold of each size with the total quantity of ice cream sold. The suggestion is to 
do the same for franchised stores, to control the portions; while to monitor the achievement of 
objectives it is suggested to calculate the deviation between the effective volume of sales and 
Product Volume of 
purchases to 
Artisani (kg 
and €) 
Volume 
of sales 
(kg and €) 
Volume of 
sales (by 
type of 
unit) 
Defined 
sales 
objective 
(kg and €)  
Deviation 
(%) 
Number of 
customers’ 
complaints (at 
Zomato or Google 
Business) 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
(at Zomato or 
Google 
Business) 
Mystery 
Clients’ 
Score 
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the objective, by flavor. Additionally, customer satisfaction should also be evaluated, which 
can be done through the number of complaints, as well as the score in Zomato or Google 
Business. Finally, to gather all information about performance in the same report, Mystery 
Client scores should be included too. To take the most advantage of this tool, it is proposed to 
create a yearly business review meeting with each franchisee to discuss their results, define a 
development plan and establish objectives for the following year.  
1.3. Social control: It is inexistent in Artisani’s present control system, but necessary to create 
an environment of trust, common values and a shared culture. Thus, it should be applied equally 
to all franchisees. The mechanisms suggested are the creation of quarterly informal gatherings 
for the entire network and a formal one at least once a year. This could be for example, an 
awards gala to distinguish the top performer, as the “Best franchisee of the year” and the prize 
of going with Luísa Lacerda to Sigep Rimini, the most important trade fair for artisanal 
production of ice cream (appendix H). This would enable the share of best practices, 
franchisees’ socialization and would motivate them to achieve excellence. More regular 
communication between parties is also encouraged to increase their incentive to act in Artisani’s 
best interests and promote a sense of trust. For that effect, a fortnightly newsletter to share 
information, promotions or events is proposed. 
2. Control matrix: Control and autonomy are complementary concepts, so the approach 
suggested integrates both and allows to systemize the adaptation of measures to each franchisee. 
Figure 1- Control Matrix proposed for By Artisani’s chain 
  
 
 
 
 
1. Junior Experts 
 
2.Senior Experts 
 
3. Junior complementary partner 
 
4. Senior complementary partner 
Years of the relationship franchisor-franchisee 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
co
n
tr
o
l 
ap
p
li
ed
 
Ice cream is the core 
business 
Ice cream is not the 
core business 
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The framework is a control matrix with four quadrants, each one associated with a certain 
combination of control procedures, since these must be tailored to each franchisee, according 
to the degree of risk for Artisani in case on non-compliance (directly related with ice cream 
being the core business or not, as explained in section 2 of “Diagnosis of the issue”) and years 
of experience, because as explained in the literature review, more experienced franchisees have 
distinct control needs and preferences than others with reduced experience. According to Luísa 
Lacerda, one year is the necessary period for a franchisee to acquire the necessary competences, 
so that is the period considered. Outcome control has a positive effect in the satisfaction of 
experienced franchisees, since it respects their desire for autonomy. Less experienced 
franchisees require more behavior control as they need training and support about operating 
methods. Thus, according to the relationship’s length, it is necessary to balance between 
behavior and outcome control. The categorization of franchisees according to the matrix can be 
consulted in appendix I and shows a balanced distribution among quadrants.  
2.1. Junior Experts: Franchisees with less than one year of activity and ice cream as core 
business. The lack of experience combined with the required high service and product quality, 
creates the need for further control, mostly behavior. Artisani should maintain the initial 
training but should also include quarterly training sessions to ensure the maintenance of service 
quality. Mystery client visits must continue to have a monthly frequency to evaluate compliance 
and implement correcting measures timely. The minimum score should be 90%, since they will 
have more support and therefore a better result should be demanded. At this stage, visits from 
the management team should also occur monthly to do on-site checkups of operating methods. 
Regarding output control, these franchisees should have quarterly objectives, instead of 
monthly, to avoid an overburden before they dominate operating methods fully. Performance 
evaluation should attribute higher relevance to customer satisfaction at this stage.  
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2.2. Senior Experts: Ice cream is their core business, but they are more experienced, so output 
control must be dominant. They already know the operating methods, and unless changes are 
introduced, behavior control can be less frequent. Consequently, visits by the management team 
and by mystery clients should happen quarterly. That allows for a higher level of perceived 
trust and autonomy. The minimum score should also be 90%. Output control can be applied 
through the definition and monitor of monthly targets with high relevance to sales objectives.  
2.3. Junior Complementary Partners: Ice cream is a complementary business, so the level of 
control and overall support can be lower when compared to the first quadrant. Suggested 
measures include the initial training and unscheduled further sessions, if necessary. Visits by 
the management team and by mystery clients should be monthly, as their lack of experience 
demands high support and monitoring. The MC should have a minimum score of 80%. Output 
control should be more focused on customer satisfaction instead of sales. 
2.4. Senior Complementary Partners: Ice cream is a complementary business, but they are 
part of the network for more than a year. Behavior control should include training if necessary, 
mystery client evaluations happening quarterly, and quarterly visits from Artisani’s 
management team. Output control measures should be dominant and include sales and customer 
satisfaction targets. Sales targets should be less demanding than the ones defined for the second 
quadrant, as these franchisees depend less on ice cream sales and thus their focus is different.  
Table 3- Quadrants’ comparison  
Quadrant Behavior Control  Output control 
1. Junior 
Experts 
- 100h of initial training and scheduled quarterly 
training sessions  
- MC’s score ≥ 90%, monthly  
- Monthly visits from the management team  
- Quarterly objectives regarding sales 
- Monthly objectives for customer satisfaction 
with relatively higher standards 
2. Senior 
Experts 
- Training sessions according to needs 
- MC’s score ≥ 90%, quarterly 
- Quarterly visits from the management team 
- Monthly sales and customer satisfaction 
objectives  
- Highest demanding objectives in terms of 
sales 
3. Junior 
Complementary 
Partners 
- 100h of initial training and unscheduled training 
sessions if necessary 
- MC’s score ≥ 80%, monthly 
- Monthly visits from the management team 
- Quarterly objectives regarding sales for best-
selling flavors 
- Monthly objectives for customer satisfaction 
with relatively lower standards 
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4. Senior 
Complementary 
Partners 
- Training sessions according to needs 
- MC’s score ≥ 80%, quarterly 
- Quarterly visits from the management team 
- Monthly sales and customer satisfaction 
objectives  
- Sales objectives should be focused only on 
best-selling flavors 
 
The proposed control system for Artisani includes mechanisms of all types of control. Formal 
control mechanisms can be adapted to each franchisee’s characteristics, while social control is 
the same for all, because the goal is to create a common culture and increase trust among the 
network. Some of Artisani’s current mechanisms were maintained, with improvements, and 
new ones were suggested to fill existent gaps and decrease the perceived risk for the franchisor, 
without compromising franchisees’ autonomy, a key element of the current business strategy. 
An estimation of costs for one year, based on information provided by the company regarding 
the unitary cost of current mechanisms, and on the frequency of each one multiplied by the 
number of franchisees in each quadrant can be found in table 4, which summarizes the whole 
control system. Costs for the quarterly training sessions to franchisees in the first quadrant were 
calculated assuming these would be provided to the three franchisees simultaneously and will 
decrease in following years if no new franchisees are added to the network. 
Table 4- Summary of the control system proposed 
Mechanism 
Type of 
Control 
Depends on 
the matrix? 
- Y/N 
Periodicity 
Unitary Cost 
(€) 
Estimated 
total cost per 
year (€) 
Responsible 
MC Report Behavior Y Monthly/Quarterly 20 1.920 Outsourced 
Training 
sessions 
Behavior Y 
Quarterly/according 
to needs 
1.000 4.000 
Artisani’s staff 
from owned-stores 
Managers’ 
visits 
Behavior Y 
Monthly/quarterly/ 
unscheduled 
N/A N/A 
Artisani’s 
commercial 
director 
Performance 
Report 
Output Y Monthly 0 0 
Artisani and 
Franchisees 
Awards gala Social N Yearly TBD TBD Artisani 
Franchising 
Newsletter 
Social N Fortnightly 
10€ (monthly 
subscription) 
120 Artisani 
Informal 
meetings 
Social N Quarterly N/A N/A 
Artisani and 
Franchisees 
Business 
review 
meeting 
Output N Yearly N/A N/A Artisani 
Total: 6.040€ 
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Discussion and conclusions 
This study was focused on developing a control system for Artisani’s franchising, to satisfy the 
franchisor’s need for control without jeopardizing franchisees’ current high level of autonomy. 
 Previous research regarding control in franchising was fragmented, focusing on specific issues, 
instead of the overall management control system within a single franchising chain. Besides, 
the unusual high autonomy in Artisani’s franchising makes it an intrinsic case study, which 
adds more value in terms of theoretical implications. The proposed solution provides an 
integration of the most relevant and recent concepts of research regarding control and 
franchisees’ autonomy; and highlights the influence of their level of experience (Dant and 
Gundlach, 1999; Mellewigt et al., 2011; Crosno and Tong, 2018). It also integrates formal and 
social control for better results (Yakimova et al., 2018; Das and Teng, 2001; Brookes and 
Roper, 2011). Hence, it is more comprehensive and complete, since authors tended to focus 
either on the relationship between the formal types of control, or in the integration of overall 
formal control with social control, without an approach that would integrate all elements 
simultaneously. Another addition to theory comes from allowing for adaptation to each 
franchisee’s profile, considering more elements besides their level of experience. 
For managers, the study highlights that standardization and autonomy can be integrated in 
franchising, and that control issues that may arise from that can be managed, as long as there is 
a complete control system adapted to the chain, to maintain trust and also to motivate, instead 
of imposing, compliance. Thus, it provides guidelines for any franchising control system and 
brings attention to the need of being careful before deciding on a “one-size-fits-all” approach 
for control. Additionally, franchising in the Artisanal Ice Cream sector was until now very 
unexplored, due to managers’ concern that with a product as sensitive, product/service quality 
monitoring would be an issue. So, this study provides insights on how to develop control to 
make franchising a suitable strategy for this market. 
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Nonetheless, it presents some limitations. First, there is a design limitation, since it is a 
qualitative case study, specific for Artisani’s franchising, directly related with its particular low 
standardization and inherent higher risk of non-compliance, depending on the core business of 
the franchisee. In most franchising chains, standardization is higher, so control mechanisms can 
be more standardized too. Thus, due to the uniqueness of Artisani’s franchising, the proposed 
system cannot be generalized or directly implemented by other companies. Consequently, 
future research should focus on the development of a more general control system for 
franchising, including practical control mechanisms, but allowing for some extent of adaption 
according to the firm or sector.  
Therefore, this study can be considered a basis for future multiple case study approaches in the 
future, including firms with different characteristics and from different industries, as well as 
quantitative research to build on this framework with more data collected for example through 
surveys applied to franchisees, as the focus was mainly on franchisor’s considerations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A- Control mechanisms identified by author  
Authors Categories of mechanisms Mechanisms  
Brookes and 
Roper (2011) 
       - Social/Relational Control 
 
      
       - Operational Control 
- Participative decision making; multi-directional 
communication; shared norms and culture 
 
- Quality control processes; financial targets set and 
monitored centrally; management by contract 
 
Das and Teng 
(2001) 
- Behavior Control 
 
 
- Output Control 
 
- Social Control 
- Policies and Procedures for behavior standards with 
rewards or penalties; staffing and training sessions 
 
- Setting objectives, planning and budgeting 
 
- Construction of a shared decision-making process; 
frequent socialization moments 
Doherty and 
Alexander 
(2006) 
N/A - Franchising agreement 
- Support activities 
- Creation of chemistry and shares values 
 
Yakimova et al. 
(2018) 
- Compliance- promoting-
procedures  
 
 
- Marketing-trust-building-
procedures 
 
- Social-comparison-activating-
procedures 
- Compliance monitoring, remedial actions, rewards 
and threat of punishment for service delivery and 
store’s image 
 
- Goal setting and planning, goal support and 
monitoring, and manager communications. 
 
- Cross-unit branding performance monitoring 
information (e.g. awards ceremonies) 
 
Source: Author’s Analysis  
 
Appendix B- Ice cream categories definition 
Category Definition 
Take-home and Bulk Ice 
Cream 
Ice cream in the form of multiple-serving ice cream tubs 
(e.g. Carte D’Or) and ice cream cakes (e.g. Vienetta), for 
take-home and bulk consumption. 
Impulse- Single Serve Ice 
Cream 
Includes the formats of single-serve tubs, packaged cones 
(e.g. Cornetto), ice cream sandwiches and coated ice creams 
(e.g. Magnum). 
Artisanal Ice Cream Original from Italy, this ice cream is traditionally produced 
in smaller quantities per day by local producers. Includes a 
strong concern with the quality and freshness of ingredients, 
following specific recipes and techniques. 
Source: Canadean, 2015 
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Appendix C- Costs of opening an owned-store (e.g. Álvares Cabral Store) 
 
Source: Ferreira, I. (2017). “New Challenges in the Artisanal Ice Cream Market: The 
marketing strategy to enhance Artisani’s brand awareness”. Católica Lisbon School of 
Business and Economics 
 
Appendix D- Interview Scripts 
 
Appendix D.1- First Interview with Luísa Lacerda and João Gaspar 
Date: 16/10/2018   Duration: 30-45 minutes 
Company’s background and current status 
1. Companys’s history 
2. Why not expanding internationally? 
3. Current challenges and identified threats and opportunities? 
4. Goals for the short-term? 
5. How significant is franchising in terms of results? 
The franchising network 
6. What was the motivation to develop the franchising network? 
7. Why the specific format of “By Artisani”? 
8. Why choosing to have such high adaption? Did you face any issues? 
9. How do you integrate owned-stores with franchised ones?  
10. Can you show me an example of the contract with the franchisees? 
11. Which are Artisani’s and franchisees’ responsibilities? 
Current control mechanisms 
12. How is communication between you and the franchisees, and the franchisees among 
themselves? Which channels are used? 
13. Are there any objectives defined for each of them or do they have to do it themselves? 
14. Do you have any particular store that serves to test new concepts or alterations to business 
methods? 
15. Do you track the results for franchisees vs owned stores? (e.g. sales, customer satisfaction, 
etc.) 
16. Can you share with me how control is currently implemented? Which mechanisms do you 
use? 
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17. When one of the franchisees has a performance below expectations, what is done? And 
when the results are outstanding, do you ask them to share their best practices?  
 
Appendix D.2- Last Interview with Luísa Lacerda and João Gaspar 
Date: 21/11/2018   Duration: 45 minutes 
Presentation of conclusions from analysis and the proposed control system 
Information to complete the control system 
1. Which KPI’s do you use in owned-stores to evaluate performance? Can those be extended 
to franchisees? Are there any specific objectives that could be defined for franchisees? 
2. Which frequency should performance evaluations have for each type of franchisee?  
3. Currently, you provide 100 hours of initial training to franchisees’ staff. When there are new 
hires or innovations, do you feel the need to give more training? 
4. Why do you currently do Mystery Client evaluations for all stores monthly? Isn’t it 
redundant for franchisees who consistently present the same level of performance? Do you 
consider the frequency could be adapted? 
5. Which period do you consider adequate for a franchisee to be consider experienced? 
6. In your opinion, does non-compliance of franchisees with ice cream as core business 
represent more, less or equal risk when compared to franchisees without ice cream as core 
business? 
7. Which type of franchisees asks for more support and guidance?  
8. Would it be possible, and would it make sense to create rewards for the best performers? 
Which rewards do you suggest? 
9. From 0-10, how useful would it be to have a control report to monitor franchisees’ results? 
Which elements should be included? 
 
Appendix D.3- Interview with franchisee (Loungelato by Artisani) 
Date: 23/11/2018    Duration: 30 minutes 
Presentation of conclusions from analysis and the proposed control system 
Information to complete the control system and franchisee’s perspective 
1. Do you agree that control is currently lacking in the network?  
2. From 0-10, how relevant do you consider franchisor’s control? 
3. Which improvements do you consider that could be implemented in current control 
mechanisms? In your opinion are those efficient? 
4. Which period do you consider adequate for a franchisee to be consider experienced? 
5. Due to your previous experience as a McDonald’s franchisee, do you consider Artisani 
could benefit from any control mechanism that franchising chains with more 
standardization currently implement? 
6. Do you consider that the current level of communication is adequate? Would you like to 
have more contact with other franchisees or in your opinion that is not necessary?  
7. Would it be possible, and would it make sense to create rewards for the best performers? 
Which rewards do you suggest? 
8. Do you believe a more structured control system could benefit not only Artisani, but also 
franchisees and the network as a whole? 
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Appendix E- By Artisani’s image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Artisani’s website 
 
Sweet and Salty By Artisani Dolce Tentazione By Artisani Vela Latina By Artisani 
La Gelateria By Artisani Sabóia By Artisani Armazéns Congrumbeiro By Artisani 
Lilla Vanilla By Artisani Elétrico 28 By Artisani 
USpot By Artisani Solo Gelato By Artisani Loungelato By Artisani 
Capricciosa By Artisani 
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Appendix F- Artisani’s sales to each type of franchisee in August 2018 
 
Source: Derived from appendix V-I 
 
 
Appendix F.1- Sales of each By Artisani in August 2018 (the month with higher demand- 
representative of full capacity) 
 
 
Source: Artisani 
 
  
27%
73%
Without Ice Cream as core business With Ice Cream as core business
Franchisee Location 
Value of Artisani's sales to each store 
(€) 
With Ice Cream as core business     
Vela Latina By Artisani  Belém 6.289,2 
LounGelato By Artisani Odivelas 5.614,3 
Solo Gelato By Artisani  Cacilhas 12.935,06 
Dolce Tentazione By Artisani  Algés 2.290,82 
La Gelataria By Artisani  Marina de Cascais 1.510,64 
Lila Vanilla By Artisani  Alvor 5.163,94 
Without Ice Cream as core business     
Sweet and Salty By Artisani  Coimbra 625,73 
USpot By Artisani  Linda-a-Velha 3.446,43 
Capricciosa By Artisani  Carcavelos 4.347,35 
Elétrico 28 By Artisani  Freeport Alcochete 2.289,83 
Sabóia By Artisani  Monte Estoril 1.240,39 
Armazéns Cogumbreiro By Artisani Açores 601,16 
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Appendix G- Template Report for Performance Evaluation with illustrative data 
 
 
Source: Author’s Proposal 
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Appendix H- Sigep Rimini 
 
Source: Sigep’s website 
 
 
Appendix I- Categorization of franchisees according to the control matrix 
Franchisee Years as franchisee Ice cream is core business (Y/N) Quadrant in the matrix 
Vela Latina 1 Y 2 
Dolce 
Tentazione 
1 Y 2 
Sweet and 
Salty 
-1 N 3 
Armazéns 
Cogumbreiro 
1 N 4 
Sabóia 1 N 4 
La Gelateria -1 Y 1 
Lila Vanilla 1 Y 2 
Elétrico 28 1 N 4 
Cappriciosa 1 N 3 
Solo Gelato -1 Y 1 
Loungelato -1 Y 1 
U Spot -1 N 3 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
